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Abstract Due to economic globalization, each country’s economic law, including tax laws and tax treaties, 
has been forced to work as a single network. However, each jurisdiction (country or region) has not made 
its economic law under the assumption that its law functions as an element of one network, so it has brought 
unexpected results. We thought that the results are exactly international tax avoidance. To contribute to the 
solution of international tax avoidance, we tried to investigate which part of the network is vulnerable. 
Specifically, focusing on treaty shopping, which is one of international tax avoidance methods, we attempt 
to identified which jurisdiction are likely to be used for treaty shopping from tax liabilities and the 
relationship between jurisdictions which are likely to be used for treaty shopping and others. For that 
purpose, based on withholding tax rates imposed on dividends, interest, and royalties by jurisdictions, we 
produced weighted multiple directed graphs, computed the centralities and detected the communities. As a 
result, we clarified the jurisdictions that are likely to be used for treaty shopping and pointed out that there 
are community structures. The results of this study suggested that fewer jurisdictions need to introduce 
more regulations for prevention of treaty abuse worldwide. 
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1 Introduction 
 
The financial crisis that occurred in 2008 not only brought about a once-in-a-100-years recession in terms 
of economic activity, it also represented a once-in-a-100-years turning point in international taxation. In 
dealing with the financial crisis, European countries were forced to raise consumption tax rates to enable 
large-scale fiscal spending, while the media and nonprofit organizations focused on bringing to light 
international tax avoidance by multinational companies (Inman 2016; Americans for Tax Fairness 2015). 
With economic globalization, international tax avoidance has increased with the facilitation of cross-border 
transactions. 
Since tax treaties are basically concluded between two jurisdictions 1 , it has hitherto been 
considered that problems relating to tax treaties should be discussed between the two contracting 
jurisdictions. However, it has been found that using a particular bilateral tax treaty in international tax 
                                                   
1 The meaning of “jurisdiction” is almost the same as that of “country and region.” 
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avoidance erodes the tax sources of jurisdictions that did not conclude the bilateral tax treaty. As a result, 
vulnerabilities in one jurisdiction’s tax treaty potentially erodes other jurisdictions’ tax bases. For example, 
it is said that the reason why Mongolia did not conclude a tax treaty with the Netherlands is that Mongolia 
was worried that its tax base would erode under a tax treaty with the European country (McGauran 2013). 
 Economic globalization has significant implications for multinationals’ business activities and 
international economic law. The activities of multinationals cross more borders and become more complex. 
In 1975, there were just 1,200 tax treaties worldwide; today, there are 3,200. In light of this, new thinking 
is beginning to emerge in the field of international tax law. It seeks to understand each jurisdiction’s 
economic laws, including tax laws and tax treaties, as a single legal system (Ogata 2016). 
Meanwhile, in recent years, network science has made remarkable progress by offering accurate 
network information in various fields. Although each field is different, finding networks follows the same 
principle (Barabási 2016). With this advance, network science has revealed interesting results that had 
hitherto not been found in a broad realm from sociology to physics. This study is an attempt to highlight an 
interesting aspect that has not yet been found far by making use of the knowledge of network science in the 
realm of international taxation, focusing particularly on the issue of international tax avoidance. 
In the field of international taxation, as prior studies incorporating the method of network science, 
some studies have analyzed the withholding tax rate on dividends (Polak S. 2014; Van‘t Riet et al. 2014; 
Hong 2017), but they only studied withholding tax on dividends. The purpose of this study is to clarify 
“Treaty Shopping,” which multinationals are said to use as one international tax avoidance scheme, from 
the viewpoint of tax rates and using the methods of network science. We study all important passive income, 
that is, dividends, interest, and royalties, and look for the relationships among each jurisdiction. 
 
2 International Tax Avoidance 
 
2.1 International Tax System 
 
Companies are subject to various forms of taxation in the process of conducting cross-border 
transactions, most importantly corporate tax and withholding tax. According to international custom, each 
jurisdiction has the primary right to tax income which arises in or is derived from that jurisdiction (Arnold 
2016). Therefore, each jurisdiction imposes corporate tax on business income arising in its jurisdiction and 
imposes withholding tax on dividends, interest, and royalties derived from its jurisdiction and paid to other 
jurisdictions. Even if dividends, interest and royalties are paid to companies in the same group, withholding 
tax is imposed as long as the group company is in another jurisdiction. 
However, when dividends, interest, and royalties are paid to jurisdictions that conclude a tax 
treaty, the amount of withholding tax is often lower than usual. This is because many tax treaties have 
provisions to reduce the withholding tax rate or exempt the company from paying the tax altogether. This 
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reduction or exemption benefit is generally called a tax treaty benefit. The purpose of offering a tax treaty 
benefit is to encourage economic activities between the two contracting jurisdictions, so the reduction or 
exemption is applied only to dividends, interest, and royalties paid to the other contracting state. 
 
2.2 Treaty Shopping 
 
The tax treaty benefits considered, the amount of withholding tax may be reduced by circumventing the 
third jurisdiction rather than paying dividends, interest, and royalties directly to other jurisdictions. For 
example, suppose that jurisdiction A (the source jurisdiction) imposes a 25% withholding tax, and 
jurisdiction C imposes a 5% withholding tax (Figure 1). Because jurisdiction A has concluded a tax treaty 
with jurisdiction C, the withholding tax is waived for dividends, interest and royalties paid from jurisdiction 
A to jurisdiction C. In this case, if a company located in jurisdiction A pays dividends, interest, and royalties 
directly to a company located in jurisdiction B, a 25% withholding tax are imposed. However, if a company 
located in jurisdiction A pays its dividends, interest, and royalties to a company located in jurisdiction B 
via jurisdiction C (the conduit jurisdictions), it is exempted from the withholding tax for payments made 
between jurisdiction A and jurisdiction C because of the A = C tax treaty, and jurisdiction C imposes a 5% 
withholding tax on payments made between jurisdiction C and jurisdiction B. In a case where a company 
located in jurisdiction A pays its dividends, interest, and royalties to a company located in jurisdiction B, if 
it pays them via jurisdiction C, it can avoid a 20% withholding tax, compared to paying them directly. 
 
Fig. 1 Treaty shopping 
 
Reducing the amount of tax through the unexpected use of tax treaty benefits described above is called 
“Treaty Shopping.” treaty shopping is not illegal unless violates the provisions of a jurisdiction’s tax law 
or tax treaty, but particularly if it is done solely to reduce the amount of tax, it is called “treaty abuse” 
(Marian 2016) or “improper use of the convention” (OECD 2015) and should be corrected. 
For companies engaged in treaty shopping, this is just one of the ways to avoid withholding tax. 
However, for source jurisdictions, this is one of the ways in which their rights to impose taxation are eroded 
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by third jurisdictions (conduit jurisdictions). It is source jurisdictions that originally have the right to impose 
taxation since the dividends, interest, and royalties are income derived from their jurisdiction. Nevertheless, 
it is the third jurisdictions that impose their tax on this income. This is why treaty shopping is regarded as 
a form of tax base erosion and is viewed as a problem in the area of international taxation. 
In this way, when the tax laws and tax treaties of multiple countries overlap, opportunities for an 
unexpected reduction in the tax burden may be created. This is called international tax avoidance. We see 
international tax avoidance as a problem emerging in an environment where economic globalization makes 
the economic legal system of each country one system as a whole. This is because we use the method of 
network science for international taxation. 
 
3 Withholding Tax Network 
 
3.1 Data 
 
The data relating to the withholding tax rate of dividends, interest, and royalties comes from Ernst Young 
(2017) and Diamond (2017a). The 165 jurisdictions subject to this study are as shown in Table 1. With 
respect to the withholding tax rate on dividends, many tax treaties apply different tax rates depending on 
the percentage of holdings. Generally, the higher the shareholding ratio, the lower the tax rate. The interest 
in this study is in the tax burden that arises when the profit is transferred within a corporate group. This is 
because international tax avoidance by multinationals is often done through the transfer of their profits 
between group companies. Therefore, assuming that the dividend was generated by a 100% wholly owned 
subsidiary, the lowest tax rate are applied. Regarding interest, some jurisdictions have applied different tax 
rates for non-bank deposits and bank deposits. For the reasons mentioned above, it is assumed that the tax 
rate for the non-bank deposit is applied. 
Some tax treaties have other requirements for granting withholding tax exemptions or reductions, 
apart from the shareholding ratio mentioned above. We consider that all requirements are met in this case. 
Moreover, the applied withholding tax rate is not always clear because the wording in a given tax treaty 
and the relationship between domestic tax laws and tax treaties are not always clear. In these cases, the 
lowest tax rate among the possible withholding tax rates is applied. On the other hand, although some 
jurisdictions do not impose withholding tax according to their domestic tax laws, their tax treaties determine 
the withholding tax rate. Since the primary purpose of tax treaties is usually to avoid international double 
taxation, it is considered that withholding tax is not imposed, but only in this case, we assume that the tax 
rate stipulated in tax treaties is to be applied. 
It is also necessary to consider corporate taxes in the third jurisdiction when calculating the strict 
amount of tax. This is especially true in the case of dividends. However, only a few jurisdictions impose 
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corporate tax on dividend income today2 (Dittmer 2012). For this reason, corporate taxes in the third 
jurisdiction are not considered in this study. 
 
Table 1  165 jurisdictions subject to this study 
                                                   
2 Many countries have introduced participation exemptions. For example, in Japan, corporate tax is 
exempted for 95% of dividend income. 
Afghanistan 
Costa Rica 
(Costa) 
Indonesia Moldova Senegal 
Albania 
Côte d’Ivoire 
(Cote) 
Iraq Monaco 
Republic of Serbia 
(Serbia) 
Algeria Croatia 
Republic of Ireland 
(Ireland) 
Mongolia Seychelles 
Angola Curacao 
Isle of Man 
(Man) 
Republic of 
Montenegro 
(Montenegro) 
Singapore 
Argentina Cyprus Israel Morocco 
Sint Maarten 
(Sint) 
Armenia 
Czech Republic 
(Czech) 
Italy Mozambique 
Slovak Republic 
(Slovak) 
Australia Denmark Jamaica Myanmar Slovenia 
Austria 
Dominican 
Republic 
(DominicanR) 
Japan Namibia 
South Africa 
(South) 
Azerbaijan Ecuador 
Channel Islands 
Jersey 
(Jersey) 
Netherlands 
South Sudan 
(Ssudan) 
Bahamas Egypt Jordan 
New Zealand 
(NZ) 
Spain 
Bahrain 
El Salvador 
(El) 
Kazakhstan Nicaragua 
Sri Lanka 
(Sri) 
Belarus 
Equatorial Guinea 
(Equatorial) 
Korea Nigeria Suriname 
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Belgium Estonia Kosovo 
Commonwealth of 
the Northern 
Mariana Islands 
(Mariana) 
Swaziland 
Bermuda Ethiopia Kuwait Norway Sweden 
Bolivia Fiji Kyrgyzstan Oman Switzerland 
Bonaire, Sint 
Eustatius and 
Saba 
(Bonaire) 
Finland Laos Pakistan Taiwan 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
(Bosnia) 
France Latvia 
Palestinian 
Authority 
(Palestinian) 
Tanzania 
Botswana Gabon Lebanon Panama Thailand 
Brazil Georgia Lesotho 
Papua New 
Guinea 
(Papua) 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
(Trinidad) 
British Virgin 
Islands 
(Virgin) 
Germany Libya Paraguay Tunisia 
Brunei 
Darussalam 
(Brunei) 
Ghana Liechtenstein Peru Turkey 
Bulgaria Gibraltar Lithuania Philippines Uganda 
Cambodia Greece Luxembourg Poland Ukraine 
Cameroon Guam 
Macau Special 
Administrative 
Region of China 
(Macau) 
Portugal 
the United Arab 
Emirates 
(UAE) 
Canada Guatemala 
Republic of 
Macedonia 
(Macedonia) 
Puerto Rico 
(Puerto) 
the  United 
Kingdom 
(UK) 
Cayman Islands 
(Cayman) 
Channel Islands 
Guernsey 
(Guernsey) 
Madagascar Qatar 
the United States 
(US) 
Cape Verde Guinea Malawi Romania US Virgin Islands 
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Note: The parentheses represent abbreviations used in the following tables and figures. 
 
3.2 Constructing the network 
 
3.2.1 Weighted Multi Directed Graph 
 
As a withholding tax network, we produces a weighted multi directed graph. In the graph, the vertices 
represent jurisdictions, and all pairs of vertices are connected by arcs because, logically, any jurisdiction 
can pay dividends, interest, and royalties to any other jurisdictions. Every arc has the withholding tax 
imposed on dividends, interest, and royalties as a weight. In addition to withholding tax, all arcs also are 
given a slight weight of 1×10－６ as a sanction. This is because it costs money, for instance registration fees, 
to establish a company in a jurisdiction, even if the company is only a paper company. 
Therefore, in the case where jurisdiction A imposes a 20% withholding tax on the dividend and 
jurisdiction B imposes a 30% withholding tax, the dividend’s weighted multi directed graph is as shown in 
Figure 2. In other words, the arc from jurisdiction A to jurisdiction B has 20 + 1×10－6 as the weight, and 
the arc from jurisdiction B to jurisdiction A has 30 + 1×10－６. 
(Cape) (Uvirgin) 
Chad Guyana Malaysia 
Russian 
Federation 
(Russian) 
Uruguay 
Chile Honduras Maldives Rwanda Uzbekistan 
China 
Hong Kong 
Special 
Administration 
Region of China 
(HK) 
Malta 
St. Lucia 
(Lucia) 
Venezuela 
Colombia Hungary Mauritania 
Saint-Martin 
(Martin) 
Vietnam 
Democratic 
Republic of 
Congo 
(CongoDR) 
Iceland Mauritius 
São Tomé and 
Príncipe 
(Sao) 
Zambia 
Republic of 
Congo 
(CongoR) 
India Mexico 
Saudi Arabia 
(Saudi) 
Zimbabwe 
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Fig. 2  An example of jurisdiction A and jurisdiction B 
 
We also created graphs with the arcs removed according to the threshold values. The thresholds 
provided are seven, 30, 25, 20, 15, 10, 5, and 0, and arcs were removed when weights exceeding the 
threshold were given. In the case of jurisdiction A and jurisdiction B, the arc from jurisdiction B to 
jurisdiction A are removed, but in graphs where the threshold value is 25 or less (Figure 3). 
 
A                                           B 
Fig. 3  An example of jurisdiction A and jurisdiction B. A: over threshold of 25, B: threshold 25 and 20. 
 
3.2.2 Weighted Undirected Graph 
 
We also constructed a network that transformed the weighted multiple directed graphs into weighted 
undirected graphs. In producing the weighted undirected graphs, the problem we faced is the weight added 
on each edge, for withholding tax rate differs depending on the jurisdiction paying dividends, interest, and 
royalties, even if those payments are made between the same two jurisdictions. For example, if a company 
in the United Kingdom pays dividends to a company in Afghanistan, no withholding tax is imposed on the 
dividends, but if a company in Afghanistan pays dividends to a company in the United Kingdom, a 20% 
withholding tax is imposed. The purpose of this paper is to identify which jurisdiction is likely to be used 
for treaty shopping, so we apply the higher withholding tax rate as a weight. For example, in the case of 
Afghanistan and the United Kingdom, it looks like Figure 4. 
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Fig.4  An example of Afghanistan and the United Kingdom 
 
From the weighted undirected graphs mentioned above, we also created graphs with the edges removed 
according to the threshold values. This is because we believe it is possible to detect community structures 
between jurisdictions that uses treaty shopping and the jurisdictions that are used for treaty shopping by 
removing the edges with high tax rates, that is, the edges that are unlikely to be used for treaty shopping. 
The thresholds provided are seven, 30, 25, 20, 15, 10, 5, and 0, and edges were removed when 
weights exceeding the threshold were given. For example, in the case of Afghanistan and the United 
Kingdom described above, a weight 20 is given in the weighted undirected graph. Therefore, vertices 
representing both jurisdictions are connected by edges up to the graph with a threshold value of 20, but in 
graphs where the threshold value is 15 or less, edges are not connected (Figure 5).  
 
A                                      B 
 
Fig.5  An example of Afghanistan and the United Kingdom. A: over threshold of 20, B: under threshold 
of 15. 
 
4 Method of Network Analysis 
 
4.1 Centrality calculation 
 
Centrality is an index that shows how important a vertex is for the overall network. The higher the value, 
the more important the vertex is in the network. However, it is not possible to define unambiguously what 
are important vertices for the overall network. In this study, centrality is calculated based on the idea that 
the vertex contributing to the shortest paths in the network is essential to the whole network. This is 
because the jurisdiction used for treaty shopping is located on the shortest path. By calculating the 
centrality, we try to estimate which jurisdiction is easier to use for treaty shopping from the viewpoint of 
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withholding tax rates. 
We use load centrality as the centrality of the graph (Goh et al. 2001). Load centrality was 
originally designed to calculate how much data processing capacity each passing point requires for the 
efficient movement of data packets in a network such as the Internet. The definition is as follows: Suppose 
one data packet is sent from vertex i to vertex j. The data packet moves along the minimum weight path. 
When one data packet is sent among all vertices like this, the amount of the data packets which passed 
through vertex k is represented by 𝑙𝑘. The load centrality of vertex k is given by  
 
𝐂𝒍(𝐤) =  ∑ 𝒍𝒊,𝒋(𝒌)𝒊≠𝒋≠𝒌                               (1) 
 
Even though load centrality is sometimes thought to be similar in concept to betweenness 
centrality (Freeman 1979), the results differ when a graph has multiple minimum weight paths (Brandes 
2008). This is because load centrality assumes a data packet is divided equally at the fork of minimum 
weight paths, while betweenness centrality is divided equally by the number of shortest paths (Figure 6). 
In this study, we think of data packets as the amount of dividends, interest, and royalties and 
withholding tax rates as weight to find the vulnerabilities of the worldwide legal system (1 Introduction). 
 
Fig. 6  Difference in the treatment of multiple shortest paths between load centrality (left) and 
betweenness centrality (right). 
 
4.2 Community detection 
 
A community is a subgraph closely connected in the network. Even though it seems that there is no strict 
definition of “community” in network science, it is thought that the network has a community structure, if 
the graph can be divided into subgraphs where the edges connected has density. We detect communities in 
the withholding tax network because we think that we can find a community structure in the network if 
there are some relationships between the jurisdictions used for treaty shopping and the jurisdictions having 
motivations to do treaty shopping. 
The problem in detecting communities is whether the communities can be detected appropriately 
from a network. As we have seen, if the community is regarded as a partial graph closely connected in the 
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network, in evaluating whether there is a community structure in the network, we basically must check 
whether the network is divided into subgraphs which have many edges in a given subgraph, but few edges 
between different subgraphs. 
We evaluate our results of community detection using modularity, which is often adopted as an 
index of evaluating community structure. (Newman 2004a; Newman 2004b). To evaluate only significant 
community structures, Modularity is calculated by subtracting the expected value of the number of edges 
when considering the community as a random graph 〈𝑡𝑖𝑗〉 from the number of edges of the divided 
communities 𝑎𝑖𝑗: 
 
𝐐 =  
𝟏
𝟐𝑴
∑ (𝒂𝒊𝒋 −
𝒌𝒊𝒌𝒋
𝟐𝑴
) 𝜹[𝑪(𝒊), 𝑪(𝒋)]𝑵𝒊,𝒋                     (2)  
 
where M is the total number of the edges, 𝐶(𝑖) is subset including vertex i, and 𝛿[𝐶(𝑖), 𝐶(𝑗)] is 1 if 𝐶(𝑖) 
and 𝐶(𝑗) are the same subset, otherwise it is 0. 
In a case of weighted graphs, 𝑎𝑖𝑗  represents the weight of the edges between vertex i and vertex 
j rather than the number of edges between them. Similarly, 𝑘𝑖𝑘𝑗 represents the expected weight of the 
edges assigned randomly to vertex i.  
Modularity is normalized so that the maximum value is 1. Therefore, it can be said that there is 
a strong community structure in the network as it moves closer to 1, but from an empirical point of view, if 
it is larger than about 0.3, it is often considered that the network has a community structure. 
We use the Louvain Method for community detection (Blondel et al. 2008). This is a method 
which tries to detect communities having high modularity by trying to optimize local and aggregating 
vertices. Specifically, it is detected as follows: First, the Louvain Method assumes every vertex belongs to 
one community. Then, calculate how much the value of modularity rises, if each vertex belongs to the same 
community with an adjacent vertex, 
 
∆𝐐 =  [
𝜮𝒊𝒏+𝒌𝒊,𝒊𝒏 
𝟐𝑴
 −  (
𝜮𝒕𝒐𝒕+𝒌𝒊,𝒊𝒏
𝟐𝑴
)
𝟐
]  −  [
𝜮𝒊𝒏
𝟐𝑴
− (
𝜮𝒕𝒐𝒕
𝟐𝑴
)
𝟐
 −  (
𝒌𝒊
𝟐𝑴
)
𝟐
]           (3) 
 
where, if vertex i belongs to a community, 𝜮𝒊𝒏 represents the sum of the weights of edges in the community, 
𝛴𝑡𝑜𝑡 represents the sum of the weights of all the edges adjacent to the vertices in the community, 𝑘𝑖,𝑖𝑛 
represents the sum of the weights of edges whose vertex i is an end point, 𝑘𝑖 represents the sum of the 
weights of edges in the community whose vertices i are endpoints. The combination of vertices with the 
greatest modularity rise are specified (the first step). Next, combinations of the specified vertices in the first 
step are aggregated into one vertex, and the size of the network is reduced (the second step). The first stage 
and the second stage are recursively repeated, and when the modularity converges, the community is 
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detected. The characteristic of the Louvain Method is not to assume all vertices belong to one community, 
but to assume each belongs to one community. 
 
5 Result 
 
5.1 The value of centrality 
 
The top countries differ markedly depending on dividends, interest and royalties and the value of centrality 
of interest is much lower than that of interest (Table2-4). In the area of international taxation, the 
Netherlands, Barbados, Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Luxembourg, Malta, and Switzerland, and the United 
Kingdom are cited as examples of jurisdictions commonly known to be likely to be used for treaty shopping 
(Diamond 2017b). According to the results of this study, we can see that these jurisdictions are the top 
jurisdictions for dividends. 
Regarding the influence of the threshold, although the value of the centrality in dividends is not 
particularly great (Figure 7), both of the centrality values in interest and royalties are starting to decline 
from the time when the threshold falls below 10 (Figure 8 and 9). The results may mean that polarization 
is occurring at withholding tax rates on dividends at above and below 5%, but 10% and 5% withholding 
tax seems to be the mainstream in many jurisdictions when it comes on interest and royalties. 
The results presented in this paper only mean that the tax is less if a company pays its dividends, 
interest, and royalties through a given jurisdiction, compared to paying them directly to other jurisdictions. 
It does not mean that such jurisdictions are used for treaty shopping in fact. Some ambivalent tax treaties 
include provisions for preventing treaty abuse while they offer tax treaty benefits (Okamura 1997). For 
example, to prevent treaties abuse, jurisdictions such as the United States introduce a limitation on benefits 
clause, and jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom introduces a principal purpose test. In this study, the 
presence or absence of these provisions is not considered. 
 
Table 2  Ranking of the value of load centrality (dividends) 
rank jurisdiction centrality rank jurisdiction centrality rank jurisdiction centrality 
1 UK 0.070639 30 Colombia 0.006188 59 Bahamas 0.000521 
2 UAE 0.058244 31 Zambia 0.006114 60 Virgin 0.000521 
3 Kuwait 0.044943 32 Tunisia 0.006075 61 Gibraltar 0.000521 
4 Netherlands 0.027664 33 Germany 0.005091 62 Guernsey 0.000521 
5 Cyprus 0.024464 34 Liechtenstein 0.004122 63 Maldives 0.000521 
6 HK 0.0239 35 Latvia 0.003342 64 Monaco 0.000521 
7 Singapore 0.0228 36 Libya 0.003185 65 Sao 0.000521 
8 Switzerland 0.022725 37 Bosnia 0.003125 66 Slovak 0.000519 
13 
 
9 Mauritius 0.022512 38 Kosovo 0.002884 67 Macau 0.000519 
10 Spain 0.02209 39 Sweden 0.002682 68 Cayman 0.00051 
11 Luxembourg 0.020043 40 Myanmar 0.002109 69 China 0.000456 
12 Lucia 0.018178 41 Brunei 0.001908 70 Ecuador 0.000415 
13 Bahrain 0.018153 42 Jersey 0.001433 71 Senegal 0.000379 
14 Malaysia 0.018115 43 Sint 0.001433 72 Australia 0.000372 
15 Qatar 0.017946 44 Curacao 0.001422 73 Algeria 0.000371 
16 Ireland 0.017523 45 Bermuda 0.001305 74 Seychelles 0.000336 
17 Estonia 0.016039 46 Man 0.001305 75 Jordan 0.000317 
18 Malta 0.015731 47 Norway 0.001206 76 Czech 0.000293 
19 US 0.01268 48 Vietnam 0.00114 77 Macedonia 0.000278 
20 South 0.011743 49 Finland 0.001128 78 Croatia 0.000256 
21 Mexico 0.010967 50 India 0.001058 79 Romania 0.000252 
22 Oman 0.010475 51 Japan 0.000949 80 Russian 0.000244 
23 Denmark 0.010308 52 Austria 0.000829 81 Saudi 0.000223 
24 Hungary 0.010111 53 Iraq 0.000723 82 Poland 0.000198 
25 Belgium 0.009487 54 Martin 0.000723 83 Greece 0.000188 
26 France 0.009139 55 Brazil 0.000706 84 Kyrgyzstan 0.00017 
27 Lithuania 0.007719 56 Cape 0.000692 85 NZ 0.00014 
28 Georgia 0.007616 57 Madagascar 0.00068 86 Trinidad 0.000122 
29 Bulgaria 0.006243 58 Palestinian 0.000657       
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Fig. 7  A: Changes in the top 5 jurisdictions' values of centrality (in the case of dividends). B: Change in 
top the 5 jurisdictions' centrality ranking (in the case of dividends). 
 
Table 3  Ranking of the value of load centrality (interest) 
rank jurisdiction centrality rank jurisdiction centrality rank jurisdiction centrality 
1 UAE 0.041796 30 Israel 0.006243 59 Gibraltar 0.000735 
2 Switzerland 0.039489 31 Algeria 0.006228 60 Jersey 0.000735 
3 Germany 0.035639 32 Japan 0.006183 61 Macau 0.000735 
4 France 0.033565 33 Seychelles 0.006154 62 Maldives 0.000735 
5 UK 0.032811 34 Portugal 0.006108 63 Nicaragua 0.000735 
6 Hungary 0.025905 35 Zambia 0.006101 64 Paraguay 0.000735 
7 Canada 0.024145 36 Cameroon 0.006067 65 Puerto 0.000735 
8 Netherlands 0.023775 37 Denmark 0.005954 66 Martin 0.000735 
9 Sweden 0.023619 38 HK 0.003959 67 Sao 0.000735 
10 Luxembourg 0.022488 39 Finland 0.003613 68 Sint 0.000735 
11 Kuwait 0.019532 40 Bermuda 0.003085 69 Belgium 0.000732 
12 Norway 0.016801 41 Man 0.003085 70 Cayman 0.000724 
13 Ireland 0.016736 42 Poland 0.003044 71 Curacao 0.000724 
14 Czech 0.016253 43 Slovak 0.001952 72 Singapore 0.000533 
15 US 0.014057 44 Guernsey 0.001901 73 Macedonia 0.000456 
16 Estonia 0.013082 45 Monaco 0.001901 74 Australia 0.000344 
17 Malta 0.011142 46 Spain 0.001657 75 Croatia 0.000321 
18 Austria 0.01061 47 Indonesia 0.001499 76 Romania 0.000262 
19 South 0.010495 48 Colombia 0.001325 77 Korea 0.000247 
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20 Cyprus 0.009644 49 Libya 0.001266 78 Saudi 0.000242 
21 Russian 0.009492 50 Liechtenstein 0.00126 79 Greece 0.000236 
22 Bahrain 0.009354 51 Malawi 0.00119 80 Panama 0.000211 
23 Latvia 0.009251 52 Zimbabwe 0.001053 81 Iceland 0.000121 
24 Italy 0.008287 53 Qatar 0.00104      
25 Belarus 0.006977 54 Suriname 0.000991      
26 Mauritius 0.006841 55 Slovenia 0.0009      
27 Oman 0.006553 56 Georgia 0.000888      
28 Ukraine 0.006507 57 Bahamas 0.000735      
29 Bulgaria 0.006357 58 Virgin 0.000735       
 
A 
 
B 
 
Fig. 8 A: Changes in the top 5 jurisdictions' values of centrality (in the case of interest). B: Changes in the 
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top 5 jurisdictions' centrality (in the case of interest). 
 
Table 4  Ranking of the value of load centrality (royalties) 
rank jurisdiction centrality rank jurisdiction centrality rank jurisdiction centrality 
1 UAE 0.079455 30 Estonia 0.007717 59 Bulgaria 0.000396 
2 Switzerland 0.079043 31 Slovak 0.006905 60 HK 0.000318 
3 France 0.05139 32 Austria 0.006784 61 Bahamas 0.000312 
4 Hungary 0.048268 33 Zambia 0.006121 62 Virgin 0.000312 
5 Mauritius 0.047201 34 Libya 0.005969 63 Gibraltar 0.000312 
6 Sweden 0.045731 35 Liechtenstein 0.005768 64 Sao 0.000312 
7 Netherlands 0.042169 36 Belgium 0.005208 65 Sint 0.000312 
8 Norway 0.037786 37 Russian 0.005146 66 Cayman 0.000303 
9 Cyprus 0.034533 38 Bermuda 0.003427 67 Curacao 0.000303 
10 Ireland 0.029864 39 Kuwait 0.003319 68 Iceland 0.000196 
11 Luxembourg 0.029044 40 Finland 0.002753 69 Cameroon 0.000164 
12 Senegal 0.029034 41 Georgia 0.001943 70 Belarus 0.00014 
13 UK 0.024726 42 Nicaragua 0.001733 71 Malaysia 0.000116 
14 Malta 0.02437 43 Paraguay 0.001733      
15 Gabon 0.024012 44 Puerto 0.001733      
16 US 0.019653 45 Martin 0.001733      
17 Spain 0.018766 46 Suriname 0.001733      
18 Bahrain 0.018091 47 Tunisia 0.001673      
19 Latvia 0.01757 48 Man 0.001374      
20 Germany 0.016731 49 Jersey 0.001374      
21 Macau 0.01241 50 Ukraine 0.001295      
22 Canada 0.012097 51 China 0.001124      
23 Monaco 0.01029 52 Czech 0.001086      
24 Korea 0.009735 53 Greece 0.001037      
25 South 0.009731 54 Singapore 0.000906      
26 Japan 0.008836 55 Croatia 0.000821      
27 Denmark 0.007992 56 Cote 0.000541      
28 Italy 0.007951 57 Seychelles 0.00047      
29 Guernsey 0.007783 58 Israel 0.000448       
 
17 
 
A 
B 
 
Fig. 9  A: Changes in the top 5 jurisdictions' values of centrality (in the case of royalties). B: Changes in 
the top 5 jurisdictions' centrality ranking (in the case of royalties). 
 
5.2 Communities Founded 
 
5.2.1 Dividends 
 
The weighted undirected graph with a threshold of 5% recorded the highest modularity (Figure 10). Its 
value is 0.2853738, or close to 0.3, so it can be said that the withholding tax network for dividends has a 
community structure. The results are as shown in Table 5 and jurisdictions in each community are arranged 
in descending order of centrality, which is in the weighted multi directed graph with a threshold of 5%. We 
identified four communities. All except community 4 has jurisdictions whose centralities are high. 
Community 1 includes the United Kingdom, Kuwait, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Spain, Luxembourg, 
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Ireland, Estonia, Malta, the United States, and other jurisdictions, community 2 includes Cyprus, Hong 
Kong, Lucia, Bahrain, Mauritius, and others, and community 3 includes the United Arab Emirates, 
Singapore, Malaysia, Qatar, and other. We cannot find a relationship between the detected communities and 
each jurisdiction’s location. The interesting thing is that mainland China and Hong Kong as well as India 
and Mauritius, which are known for their compatibility, are not in the same communities. 
In the weighted undirected graph with a threshold of 5%, there were 34 vertices with no edges 
with other vertices. This means that dividends are subject to a withholding tax rate of more than 5% when 
paid from these the jurisdictions or for the jurisdictions. Therefore, it can be said that the possibility that 
these jurisdictions will be used for treaty shopping involved dividends is extremely low. However, the 
possibility that dividends will be paid for these jurisdictions remains, given that of the 165 jurisdictions 
subject to this analysis, some jurisdictions do not impose withholding tax initially. Therefore, if dividends 
are paid for 34 jurisdictions without links in a 5% threshold weighted undirected graph, at least these 
jurisdictions not imposing withholding tax. Among the 34 jurisdictions, it is possible that the U.S. Virgin 
Islands will be used as a cash box, where corporate profits are accumulated, given their lack of corporate 
taxation. 
 
Fig. 10  Change in modularity, threshold 35 – threshold 0 (in the case of dividends) 
 
Table 5 Communities (dividends) 
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
M
o
d
u
la
ri
ty
Threshold
Community 1 Community 2 Community 3 no kink 
jurisdiction centrality jurisdiction centrality jurisdiction centrality jurisdiction centrality 
UK 0.05873 Cyprus 0.02422 UAE 0.05556 Mariana 5.39E-06 
Kuwait 0.04473 HK 0.02361 Singapore 0.02252 Tanzania 8.31E-07 
Netherlands 0.02641 Lucia 0.01814 Malaysia 0.01811 Afghanistan 0 
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Switzerland 0.02246 Bahrain 0.01786 Qatar 0.01596 Angola 0 
Spain 0.02187 Mauritius 0.01203 Norway 0.0012 Argentina 0 
Luxembourg 0.01975 Oman 0.01018 Vietnam 0.00113 Bolivia 0 
Ireland 0.01744 Georgia 0.0076 India 0.00104 Cambodia 0 
Estonia 0.01575 Bulgaria 0.00624 Japan 0.00094 Cameroon 0 
Malta 0.0155 Colombia 0.00619 NZ 0.00014 Chad 0 
US 0.01268 Liechtenstein 0.00409 Venezuela 1.95E-05 CongoDR 0 
South 0.01173 Libya 0.00315 Fiji 5.67E-06 CongoR 0 
Mexico 0.01096 Kosovo 0.00285 Mozambique 5.67E-06 DominicanR 0 
Denmark 0.01016 Myanmar 0.00207 Uruguay 4.96E-06 Equatorial 0 
Hungary 0.00983 Brunei 0.00187 Portugal 1.61E-06 Ethiopia 0 
Lithuania 0.00749 Jersey 0.0014 Azerbaijan 0 Gabon 0 
France 0.00697 Sint 0.0014 Laos 0 Guam 0 
Zambia 0.00611 Curacao 0.00139 Morocco 0 Guinea 0 
Belgium 0.00545 Bermuda 0.00127 Namibia 0 Honduras 0 
Germany 0.00508 Man 0.00127 Pakistan 0 Lebanon 0 
Latvia 0.00318 Iraq 0.00069   Lesotho 0 
Bosnia 0.0031 Martin 0.00069 Community 4 Malawi 0 
Sweden 0.00253 Brazil 0.00068 jurisdiction centrality Mauritania 0 
Finland 0.00105 Madagascar 0.00067 Seychelles 0.00011 Nicaragua 0 
Austria 0.00083 Cape 0.00066 Zimbabwe 4.28E-05 Nigeria 0 
China 0.00045 Palestinian 0.00062 Botswana 0 Papua 0 
Slovak 0.00039 Bahamas 0.00049   Paraguay 0 
Algeria 0.00037 Virgin 0.00049   Philippines 0 
Australia 0.0003 Gibraltar 0.00049   Puerto 0 
Macedonia 0.00027 Guernsey 0.00049   Rwanda 0 
Croatia 0.00025 Maldives 0.00049   Ssudan 0 
Poland 0.00019 Monaco 0.00049   Suriname 0 
Czech 0.00019 Sao 0.00049   Swaziland 0 
Russian 0.00019 Macau 0.00048   Thailand 0 
Greece 0.00018 Cayman 0.00048   Uvirgin 0 
Kyrgyzstan 0.00017 Ecuador 0.00039       
Belarus 7.86E-05 Jordan 0.0003       
Uzbekistan 7.60E-05 Saudi 0.00022       
Albania 7.42E-05 Romania 0.00018       
Armenia 5.75E-05 Trinidad 0.00012       
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5.2.2 Interest 
 
The weighted undirected network with a threshold of 5% recorded the highest modularity (Figure 11). Its 
value is 0.283715, or close to 0.3, so it can be said that the withholding tax network for interest has a 
community structure. The results are as shown in Table 6 and jurisdictions in each community are arranged 
in descending order of centrality, which is in the weighted multi directed graph with a threshold of 5%. We 
identified four communities. All except community 4 have jurisdictions whose centralities are somewhat 
high. Community 1 includes Switzerland, Germany, France, Kuwait, the United Kingdom, Ireland, and 
other jurisdictions, community 2 includes Hungary, the Netherlands, Sweden, and others, and community 
3 includes the United Arab Emirates and other. Although the United Arab Emirates has a high centrality 
value (Table 3), the size of the community to which it belongs is small (Table 6). Therefore, it may not be 
suitable for treaty shopping. Many European countries belong to Community 1 or 2. This may be because 
the European Union has issued an “Interest Directive” (2003/49/EC), which exempts corporations from 
Slovenia 4.65E-05 Tunisia 1.53E-05       
Egypt 3.12E-05 El 7.70E-06       
Panama 3.01E-05 Guyana 6.46E-06       
Ukraine 2.19E-05 Bonaire 0       
Mongolia 1.67E-05 Cote 0       
Korea 1.57E-05 Guatemala 0       
Iceland 1.29E-05 Indonesia 0       
Moldova 1.29E-05 Peru 0       
Israel 1.14E-05 Sri 0       
Chile 9.80E-06           
Canada 8.15E-06           
Uganda 6.15E-06           
Senegal 4.48E-06           
Jamaica 2.72E-06           
Italy 2.20E-06           
Costa 0           
Ghana 0           
Kazakhstan 0           
Montenegro 0           
Serbia 0           
Taiwan 0           
Turkey 0             
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paying withholding tax on interest paid within the EU member jurisdictions, to help create EU single market. 
There were 47 vertices not having edges with other vertices. Regarding these vertices, the same thing can 
be said as for the dividends (5.2.1 Dividends). 
 
Fig. 11  Change in modularity, threshold 35 – threshold 0 (in the case of interest) 
 
Table 6  Communities (interest) 
Community 1 Community 2 Community 3 no link 
jurisdiction centrality jurisdiction centrality jurisdiction centrality jurisdiction centrality 
Switzerland 0.035669 Hungary 0.022507 UAE 0.038503 Afghanistan 0 
Germany 0.029059 Netherlands 0.018449 Bahrain 0.008041 Angola 0 
France 0.027107 Sweden 0.018065 Mauritius 0.005814 Bolivia 0 
Kuwait 0.022897 Canada 0.015561 Oman 0.00555 Botswana 0 
UK 0.020226 Luxembourg 0.013706 Belgium 0.000186 Brazil 0 
Ireland 0.016536 Norway 0.013524 Seychelles 4.37E-05 Brunei 0 
US 0.013929 Portugal 0.006106 Lithuania 4.25E-05 Cambodia 0 
Czech 0.013042 Cameroon 0.006054 Swaziland 1.04E-05 Cape 1.45E-05 
Russian 0.010392 Estonia 0.005487 Mozambique 4.16E-06 Chad 0 
Austria 0.009228 HK 0.003732 Senegal 2.84E-06 CongoDR 0 
Latvia 0.008363 Bermuda 0.001896 Fiji 2.67E-06 Cote 0 
Malta 0.008265 Man 0.001896 Malaysia 0 DominicanR 0 
Cyprus 0.008104 Guernsey 0.001793 Tunisia 0 El 0 
Italy 0.007799 Monaco 0.001793   Equatorial 0 
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Zambia 0.006101 Slovak 0.001587 Community 4 Gabon 0 
China 0.006098 Colombia 0.001112 jurisdiction centrality Ghana 0 
Ukraine 0.005536 Libya 0.00104 Algeria 0.006217 Guam 0 
Denmark 0.003865 Liechtenstein 0.001033 Egypt 0 Guatemala 0 
Finland 0.003376 Suriname 0.000973   Guinea 0 
Poland 0.002567 Malawi 0.000967   Guyana 0 
South 0.002509 Zimbabwe 0.000827   Honduras 0 
Spain 0.001382 Bahamas 0.000717   India 0 
Qatar 0.000989 Virgin 0.000717   Iraq 0 
Indonesia 0.000893 Gibraltar 0.000717   Jamaica 0 
Belarus 0.000813 Jersey 0.000717   Kazakhstan 0 
Slovenia 0.000588 Macau 0.000717   Laos 0 
Singapore 0.000468 Maldives 0.000717   Lebanon 0 
Macedonia 0.000358 Nicaragua 0.000717   Lesotho 0 
Bulgaria 0.000216 Paraguay 0.000717   Madagascar 0 
Korea 0.000214 Puerto 0.000717   Mauritania 0 
Croatia 0.00021 Martin 0.000717   Morocco 0 
Greece 0.0002 Sao 0.000717   Myanmar 0 
Romania 0.000134 Sint 0.000717   Nigeria 0 
Panama 0.000134 Cayman 0.000705   Mariana 2.82E-06 
Israel 0.000127 Curacao 0.000705   Pakistan 0 
Iceland 0.0001 Georgia 0.000637   Palestinian 0 
Mongolia 7.51E-05 Saudi 0.000226   Papua 0 
Armenia 6.89E-05 Australia 0.000188   Philippines 0 
Japan 6.57E-05 Argentina 5.25E-05   Rwanda 0 
Albania 4.40E-06 Ecuador 2.91E-05   Lucia 0 
Kyrgyzstan 3.96E-05 NZ 1.44E-05   Ssudan 0 
Venezuela 3.03E-05 Jordan 1.30E-05   Taiwan 0 
Bosnia 2.88E-05 Bonaire 0   Tanzania 4.79E-06 
Uruguay 2.18E-05 Chile 0   Thailand 0 
Serbia 1.66E-05 Ethiopia 0   Trinidad 0 
Montenegro 1.58E-05 Peru 0   Uganda 0 
Moldova 1.44E-05 Sri 0   Uvirgin 0 
Kosovo 1.17E-05 Vietnam 0       
Uzbekistan 1.04E-05           
CongoR 3.00E-06           
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Namibia 2.59E-06           
Azerbaijan 0           
Costa 0           
Mexico 0           
Turkey 0             
 
5.2.3 Royalties 
 
The weighted undirected graph with a threshold of 5% recorded the highest modularity (Figure 12). Its 
value is 0.325377, which is over 0.3. Thus, the withholding tax network on royalties has a community 
structure. The results are as shown in Table 9 and jurisdictions in each community are arranged in 
descending order of centrality, which is in the weighted multi directed graph with a threshold of 5%. We 
identified five communities. All except community 5 have jurisdictions whose centralities are high. 
Community 1 includes Switzerland, Hungary, the Netherlands, Ireland, Malta, and so on, community 2 
includes France, Sweden, Norway, Luxembourg, and others, community 3 includes Senegal, Cyprus, 
Bahrain, and other, and community 4 includes the United Arab Emirates, Mauritius, and other jurisdictions. 
Although the United Arab Emirates has a high centrality value (Table 4), the size of the community to 
which it belongs is small (Table 7). Many European countries belong to Community 1 or 2. This may be 
because the EU has issued a “Royalty Directive” (2003/49/EC), which exempt corporations from paying 
withholding tax on royalties paid within the EU member jurisdictions. There are 43 vertices not having 
edges with other vertices. Regarding these vertices, the same thing can be said as for the dividends (5.2.1 
Dividends). 
 
Fig. 12  Change in modularity, threshold 35 – threshold 0 (in the case of royalties) 
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Table 7  Communities (royalties) 
25 
 
Community 1 Community2 Community 3 Community 4 no link 
jurisdiction centrality jurisdiction centrality jurisdiction centrality jurisdiction centrality jurisdiction centrality 
Switzerland 0.061055 France 0.046474 Senegal 0.029019 UAE 0.06167 Afghanistan 0 
Hungary 0.03975 Sweden 0.040768 Cyprus 0.028238 Mauritius 0.045365 Angola 0 
Netherlands 0.030205 Norway 0.028039 Bahrain 0.015465 South 0.00097 Bolivia 0 
Ireland 0.028402 Luxembourg 0.025179 Monaco 0.009766 Malaysia 2.93E-05 Botswana 0 
Malta 0.019473 US 0.019266 Guernsey 0.007469 Oman 1.87E-05 Brazil 0 
Slovak 0.006738 Latvia 0.016999 Macau 0.006517 Indonesia 0 Brunei 0 
Austria 0.006683 UK 0.012943 Libya 0.004796 Madagascar 0 Cambodia 0 
Canada 0.006667 Japan 0.008448 Liechtenstein 0.003452 Mozambique 0 Cape 0 
Zambia 0.006121 Korea 0.008326 Bermuda 0.003191 Namibia 0 Colombia 0 
Germany 0.004096 Italy 0.007662 Kuwait 0.002856     CongoDR 0 
Spain 0.003763 Russian 0.004358 Nicaragua 0.001707 Community 5 Costa 0 
Finland 0.002521 Tunisia 0.001673 Paraguay 0.001707 jurisdiction centrality DominicanR 0 
Belgium 0.001414 Estonia 0.001627 Puerto 0.001707 Cameroon 0.00016 El 0 
Ukraine 0.001283 Denmark 0.001546 Martin 0.001707 Gabon 0.024003 Equatorial 0 
Czech 0.000641 Greece 0.000856 Suriname 0.001707 CongoR 7.79E-05 Fiji 0 
Singapore 0.000521 Croatia 0.000776 Georgia 0.001528 Chad 4.57E-05 Ghana 0 
Israel 0.000386 Bulgaria 9.30E-05 China 0.001124     Guam 0 
Iceland 0.000135 Macedonia 8.72E-05 Man 0.000871     Guatemala 0 
Belarus 0.000118 Swaziland 2.58E-05 Jersey 0.000871     Guinea 0 
Poland 7.41E-05 Saudi 8.63E-06 Cote 0.00054     Guyana 0 
Kyrgyzstan 6.17E-05 Ecuador 6.92E-06 HK 0.000318     Honduras 0 
Uzbekistan 4.15E-05 Lithuania 4.90E-06 Bahamas 0.000286     India 0 
Bosnia 3.56E-05 Panama 2.51E-06 Virgin 0.000286     Iraq 0 
Armenia 2.49E-05 Sri 2.08E-06 Gibraltar 0.000286     Jamaica 0 
Pakistan 2.04E-05 Algeria 1.86E-05 Sao 0.000286     Kazakhstan 0 
Slovenia 1.41E-05 Australia 0 Sint 0.000286     Lebanon 0 
Moldova 1.41E-05 Chile 0 Cayman 0.000278     Lesotho 0 
Kosovo 1.34E-05 Jordan 0 Curacao 0.000278     Malawi 0 
Egypt 1.25E-05 Morocco 0 Seychelles 9.93E-05     Maldives 0 
Mongolia 9.67E-06 NZ 0 Bonaire 0     Mexico 0 
Romania 7.09E-06 Portugal 0 Ethiopia 0     Myanmar 0 
Montenegro 5.50E-06 Trinidad 0 Laos 0     Nigeria 0 
Serbia 5.50E-06 Turkey 0 Mauritania 0     Mariana 2.75E-05 
Venezuela 1.17E-06     Palestinian 0     Papua 0 
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6 Discussion 
 
To resolve the vulnerable elements of tax treaties, it is necessary to amend them. The realm of international 
tax law is trying to deal with the weak links that arise from a single network that tax laws and tax treaties 
of each country form, in two ways. The first approach involves multilateral treaties and the second involves 
peer review.  
The multilateral treaty aims to amend tax treaties of each country uniformly, instead of 
sequentially revising tax treaties through bilateral negotiations as in the past. When a jurisdiction ratifies a 
multilateral treaty, the new provisions stipulated in the multilateral treaty overwrite the existing provisions 
of any tax treaties that jurisdiction has concluded, producing the same effect as that of an amendment to the 
tax treaty. In order for many jurisdictions to ratify a multilateral treaty, the multilateral treaty can effectively 
include only the minimum standard deemed necessary for the prevention of treaty abuse. From the intention 
of trying to be “fair” to each jurisdiction, it seems possible only to make revisions to each jurisdiction’s tax 
treaties “uniformly.” However, according to this study, only some jurisdictions are conducive to treaty 
shopping, so to solve treaty abuse, it seems sufficient to amend the tax treaties of those jurisdictions for the 
time being. This would mean fewer jurisdictions that need to obtain consensus, which we believe would 
allow additional provisions to be introduced into the tax treaties3.  
Peer review means that jurisdictions monitors each other to determine whether provisions are 
being adequately enforced in each jurisdiction. Again, according to this study, there is a possibility that 
effective monitoring can be carried out when focusing the monitoring on jurisdictions likely to be used for 
treaty shopping. 
Moreover, international tax avoidance using tax havens is also drawing attention. Because treaty 
shopping is generally used for shifting companies’ profits to tax havens (Picciotto 1992), resolving treaty 
                                                   
3 However, seeking prevention measures only for specific countries also has the risk of disrupting efforts 
towards international tax avoidance. About how the harmful tax competition taking the initiative by the 
OECD was abandoned, see Sharman (2006). 
Lucia 1.13E-06     Qatar 0     Peru 0 
Albania 1.04E-06           Philippines 0 
Argentina 0           Rwanda 0 
Azerbaijan 0           Ssudan 0 
Taiwan 0           Tanzania 1.39E-06 
Uruguay 0           Thailand 0 
Vietnam 0           Uganda 0 
             Uvirgin 0 
                Zimbabwe 0 
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shopping may also resolve international tax avoidance using tax havens. 
 
7 Conclusion 
 
In this study, we were able to clarify which jurisdictions are likely to be used for treaty shopping from the 
viewpoint of the withholding tax rates, and the relationships between jurisdictions that are likely to be used 
for treaty shopping and jurisdictions which give rise to a motivation to undertake treaty shopping. However, 
it cannot be determined from withholding tax rates alone whether these jurisdictions are being used for 
treaty shopping in reality. As a future task, we would like to study the relationship between withholding tax 
rates and the economic activities of multinationals by using corporate data. 
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